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Abstract
In recent years, consumer UAV technology has seen considerable advances. Consumer
UAVs have become an ideal vector for privacy invasions due to their affordability, size,
maneuverability, and their ability to stream live high-quality video. There is consid-
erable proliferation of drones in both civil and military domains. Hence it is critical
to detect invading unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones in a timely manner
for both security and safeguarding privacy. Currently available solutions like active
radar, video or acoustic sensors are very expensive (especially for individuals) and
have considerable constraints (e.g., requiring visual line of sight).
Recent research on drone detection with passive RF signals provides an opportu-
nity for low-cost deployment of drone detectors on commodity wireless devices. The
state of the arts in this direction mainly focus on detecting drones using line-of-sight
(LOS) RF signals which are less noisy as compared to their non-LOS (NLOS) coun-
terparts. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing cost-effective solution for
the general public to enable non-LOS(NLOS) detection for drone privacy invasion,
which is the most common condition and it still remains an open challenge.
This thesis research provides a low-cost UAV detection system for privacy inva-
sion caused by customer drone. Our model supports NLOS detection with low-cost
hardware under $50, and hence it is affordable for the general public to deploy in their
house, apartments, and office. Our work utilizes inherent drone motions (i.e., body
shifting and vibrations) as unique signatures for drone detection. Firstly, we validated
the relationship between drone motions and RF signal under the NLOS condition us-
ing extensive experiments. This is motivated by the fact that under NLOS conditions
slight changes to the position or motion of a drone could lead to dramatic change in
multi-path components in received RF signals. The NLOS condition “amplifies” the
RF signatures introduced by drone motions.
We designed a deep learning model to capture the complex features from NLOS
RF signals. In particular, we designed and trained a long short-term memory (LSTM)
neural network [15, 27], a generative model which can effectively extract features of
inputs for NLOS drone detection. Moreover, without knowing the presence of drones,
our system starts with classifying any detected RF signals into LOS signals and NLOS
signals before the NLOS drone learner is used. Classification of LOS and NLOS sig-
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nals is feasible because they exhibit different combined features such as strength,
variance, and distribution due to their differences in multipath effects. We used the
supervised support vector machine (S-SVM) [17] as the learning model, which is ef-
fective for binary classification.
This design is validated via extensive experiments using commodity drones in res-
ident areas with other Wi-Fi enabled mobile devices.
Index Terms—Drone, UAV, Deep Learning, RF Signal, Line of-Sight
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last couple of years, the commercial and military sector in the Unites States
and globally has seen an astounding increase in Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs).
This includes drones, and drone platforms. This in turn has increased the interest
in drone detection technologies. [1, 37]. The recent report from the United States
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) tells us that it is almost becoming difficult
to count the number drones and its application in the marketplace especially in small
UAVs sector [1]. By 2020 it is estimated that there would be at least 3.17 million
UAVs [23]. This proliferation of UAVs brings advantages and disadvantages asso-
ciated with it. The advantages are that the increase in number of UAVs will add
more competition to the marketplace which will make it more affordable for general
public. Not to forget the wide range of applicability in various commercial sectors in-
cluding agriculture, medical industry, accident reporting, detecting natural disaster,
etc. UAVs are becoming something more than a tool that assists human efforts and
efficiencies in many ways.
The biggest threat UAVs possess is that it can be easily misused by people for all
the wrong reasons which can negate the benefits it brings in (or) an accidental crash
into a neighbors compound while flying a drone (Note, when we say by accident, it
means not on purpose) can cause privacy issues if the drone has video camera and it
was recording its flight [32]. In 2015, we witnessed a hobbyist crash a two feet drone
on the White House grounds which raised questions about the president’s security
[43]. Another incident of misuse was when we saw one of the busiest airports in
London being shut down for nearly 36 hours when they detected unauthorized drone
use [6]. Data and data Processing is an integral part of drone and drone development
applications. These data include but not limited to personal identifiable information,
military data, personal health information, etc. Ultimately these data if misused
could be detrimental to individual’s privacy, nation’s security and the smooth func-
tioning of commercial sector.
Detection is the key to develop good preemptive measures [18, 19, 20, 44, 46]. This
will lead the development of drone technologies in the right direction and monitor the
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misuse. A variety of UAV detection approaches have been proposed for military and
commercial security systems. One of the approaches that have been proposed in
the commercial and military sector is detecting UAVs using Active Radar technique.
This technique is used to detect wide range of regular aircrafts and large UAVs, but
they are incompetent in detecting small LOS and NLOS which may radiate similar
radioactive signals such as birds. Also, this technique are very complex and expensive
almost making it unaffordable for general public who use small UAVs.
Other approaches include Acoustic Sensors, video-based solution and passive RF
signal-based drone detection. The problem with Acoustic Sensors and Video Based
Solutions is that they are limited by distance and visual line of sight. Sometimes
these approaches are even constrained by weather conditions making it ineffective.
Bimbach et al in his recent studies have proposed a motion introduced RF signals
detection system to which relies highly on analyzing flying patterns using statistical
features of passive RF signal (i.e. RSS). The issue with passive RF based detection
systems is that they take advantage of RSS variations and assume existences of LOS.
In this paper we argue the contrary i.e. Bimbach’s approach are not always helpful
for drone detection in NLOS cases.
Introduced in this thesis, is a low-cost UAV detection system for privacy inva-
sion caused by customer drone. Our model supports NLOS detection with low-cost
hardware under $50, and hence it is affordable for the general public to deploy in
their house, apartments, and office. To be specific, we first explored and validated
the relationship between drone motions (i.e., shifting, vibration, acceleration, posi-
tion changing) and RF signal under the NLOS condition using extensive experiments.
This is motivated by the fact that under NLOS conditions slight changes to the po-
sition or motion of a drone could lead to dramatic change in multi-path components
in received RF signals. By this, the NLOS condition “amplifies” the RF signatures
introduced by drone motions. We then designed a deep learning model to capture
the complex features from NLOS RF signals. In particular, we designed and trained
a long short-term memory (LSTM) neural network [15, 27], a generative model which
can effectively extract features of inputs for NLOS drone detection. Moreover, with-
out knowing the presence of drones, our system starts with classifying any detected
RF signals into LOS signals and NLOS signals before the NLOS drone learner is used.
Classification of LOS and NLOS signals is feasible because they exhibit different com-
bined features such as strength, variance, and distribution due to their differences in
multipath effects. We used the supervised support vector machine (S-SVM) [17] as
the learning model, which is effective for binary classification.
We validated our design via extensive experiments using commodity drones in
residential areas with other mobile devices including GoPro camera and smartphones
presented. We use Raspberry PI 3 Model B with a commodity USB WiFi module
Edimax N150 as the wireless drone detector.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
A collection of contemporary literature was studied to understand the current de-
velopments in the field of UAV detection. The following sections summarizes the
relevant information researched and gives an up-to-date perception of work done in
UAV detection. UAVs have become very popular [31, 33]. In the recent past consid-
erable regulations in flight control have been put in place. But, despite these flight
control regulations, the popularity of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have grown
astronomically [33]. UAVs are increasingly being used for civilian applications, mil-
itary applications, and for personal use [33]. This rapid increase has introduced a
serious threat to privacy of the individual, public security, and military security [33].
Hence there is an urgent to need to detect drones in a reliable and faster manner [31].
Detecting drones has become a staple of military and aircraft control for a long
time. According to the underlying sensing modalities, existing drone detection sys-
tems can be classified into four major categories - Radar, Passive Radio Frequency
(RF), Audio and Video based approaches. Radar systems use active detection strat-
egy that transmits radio waves first, and then determines the presence and location
of objects by analyzing their reflections. Traditional radar systems have been demon-
strated for effective aircraft detection; however, the miniatured size of drones makes
them extremely difficult to detect because of their small reflection areas. The drone
invasion at the White House in 2015 is an example of incompetence of radar systems
in face of small drones [43]. While recent efforts on radar systems have shown their
improved accuracy in detecting drones [3, 21, 45], the high costs (tens of thousands
of dollars) prevent them from pervasive deployment by the general public. On the
other hand, drones are also increasingly using radar vision for detecting and avoiding
obstacles [21].
2.1 Radar Detection
Radar technology is being improvised to improve its scanning range. Phased-array
radars can emit radio waves in predetermined patterns, and in predetermined direc-
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tion. By using phased-array radars we can scan the entire field of view [21]. There
is a growing interest in using a distributed FMCW Radar system, which works on
fiber-optic links for detecting small drones [45]. This k-band radar systems have very
high sensitivity, linearity and flatness. They can detect low-radar cross section tar-
gets much easily. They can also measure the range and velocity of these targets [45].
Similarly, non-coherent radars are also increasingly being used for detection of low
observable objects [3].
2.2 Video-Based and Audio-Based Drone Detec-
tion
Video-based drone detection also becomes increasingly popular with the recent ad-
vances in computer vision [12, 31, 33, 42]. These approaches apply machine learning
on surveillance camera data to extract the appearance and motion cues of drones.
Challenges to this approach exist mainly on its reliance on environment conditions
(e.g., high line-of-sight visibility). How to distinguish between small drones and other
flying objects at distance [9] also remains an open challenge. Alternative types of cam-
eras such as thermal and near-infrared cameras are also considered to mitigate the
constraints of conventional surveillance cameras under low-or zero-light conditions
[30, 47]. However, these devices are also limited to line-of-sight regions, let alone
their high costs. Lian Du et al had studied the small UAV detection in videos from
a single moving camera [31]. They had used motion estimation methods, low-rank
based model, and CNN-SVM approach. J Li had studied a new approach to detect
drones from a single camera mounted on a different UAV [33]. Similarly, A Rozantstev
had studied the detection of drones using single moving camera [42].
Audio-based drone detection techniques [11, 13, 16] employ acoustic sensors to
collect suspicious audio data from drones. These collected audio data are compared
with drone acoustic signatures stored in a pre-established database. The accuracy of
audio-based detection is greatly affected by the background noise of the environment,
such as city traffic in the urban areas and other noises at nearby frequencies. In addi-
tion, these techniques are also of high cost and not suitable for pervasive deployment.
2.3 Detecting using Thermal Imaging
There are other innovative methods that are being studied for the rapid detection of
drones. Sanjay K Boddhu, and Matt McCartney had studied a collaborative smart-
phone sensing platform for the smart detection of hostile drones [9]. Infrared systems
[47] have increased the capability to detect drones many fold. Thermal imaging sen-
sors have made it possible to detect drones day and night, detect unlimited number
of target. They can ensure detection over long-range, and wide area surrounding
[47]. Similarly, Vumii’s family of long range surveillance cameras combine advanced
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video channels, thermal camera systems, continuous zoom optics and high resolution
imagers to detect and track hostile threats at a distance of more than 20 Km [30].
2.4 Detecting using Acoustic Cameras
Several researchers are studying the application of Acoustic cameras in drone detec-
tions [11, 13] . Case, Zelnio and Rigling studied the utility of Low-cost acoustic array
for the detection and tracking of UAVs [13]. Jol Busset and Florian Perrodin studied
detection of drones using advanced acoustic cameras [11]. Commercially available
models have successfully employed acoustic cameras for drone detections [16]. For
example, Drone Shield Base Processor system collects audio data and compares it
with the acoustic signatures that are preloaded in the systems database [16].
Despite, the above limitations, there is burgeoning efforts and products in the com-
mercial market place. Currently they rely heavily on acoustic sensors and Infra-Red
techniques [4, 16, 30, 47]. For example, Antidrone [4] uses DroneShield user inter-
faces in their drone detections systems, which assures high accuracy of UAV acoustic
detection. It uses both audio and visual interface to provide necessary system data
and alerts. To increase the user comfort the interface can be accessed from both web
browsers and mobile device portals [4].
2.5 RF Based Detection
The above mentioned detection system is really expensive and cannot be afforded by
common people. Currently there is considerable interest in passive RF-based drone
detection techniques. The passive RF-based technique detects drones by analyzing
various RF characteristics [8, 38, 39]. Nguyen et al had studied the detection of drones
by utilizing the packet frequency of detected RF signals [38, 39]. This technique has
an inherent drawback as the RF signals could be polluted by similar frequency out-
puts in the busy urban environment. For example, VOIP traffic can interfere and can
lead to false alarms in this method. Birnbach had worked on a protocol to use the
received signal strengths (RSS) to create a pattern from the drone invasion events [8].
Drones can then be detected by matching the newly detected RF signals to match
this pattern [8]. The biggest handicap for Birnbach’s method is that it can only de-
tect drones flying towards the detection system. Also, the RSS measurement can only
work better in the line-of-sight (LOS) condition. As we are aware, LOS conditions are
difficult to achieve in all circumstances in the urban environment [8]. Other authors
are working on software-defined radio (SDR) to distinguish drone signals from other
mobile wireless sources [24]. The SDR devices are currently available off-the-shelf,
and the detection system can be easily set up. Unfortunately, they are expensive
and can cost hundreds to thousands of dollars. Hence, they are not suitable for mass
deployment by the general public [24]. Currently most of the state-of-art RF based
approaches work best only in the LOS conditions. There is still considerable chal-
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lenge in establishing RF based drone detection systems which can be successful in
non-line-of-sight (NLOS) conditions.
There is an increased interest in leveraging Machine learning and Deep learning
technique in the field of drone detection [7, 12, 26, 35, 41, 49]. In Machine learn-
ing techniques, the problem of Drone detection is resolved into a simple equation
of finding a small rectangle that encloses the drone in a video sequence [12]. Aker
and Kalkan had studied a model in which they used an end-to-end object detection
model based on convolutional neural networks [12]. They developed an algorithm by
combining back ground subtracted real images to for creating an extensive artificial
data set for training the network [8]. Several machine learning algorithms and plat-
forms are being integrated into drone detection research [35, 49]. Supervised machine
learning algorithms are also becoming increasingly popular. For example, K-nearest
neighbors (KNN) algorithm is an innovative emerging option [41]. KNN is easy to
implement and can perform complex classification tasks. KNN is a non-parametric
learning system and does not have any assumptions about the underlying data [41].
This is especially useful in problems like signal data from drones as they do not follow
uniform distribution or linear separability [41]. Similarly, data augmentation tech-
niques [40] are also useful in improving machine learning models. In this technique
data points, especially images, are increased in the data set. This leads to increasing
number of rows and objects augmenting the machine learning process [40]. These
sophisticated machine learning techniques have the exciting possibilities in drone de-
tection systems.
Furthermore, recently, Recurrent Neural networks (RNN) and Long short-term
memory networks (LSTMs) have revolutionized the machine learning algorithms [15].
Recurrent neural networks with loops allow the information to persist and allows
the machine to think like humans. The don’t have to think from the scratch each
time [15]. LSTMs are special kind of RNN networks which can overcome long term
dependency problem and remember long term. Both RNN and LSTMs in turn have
exciting possibilities for the drone detection systems.
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Chapter 3
System Model
This thesis aims at real-time drone detection using NLOS RF signals. We will be
using one or more ground wireless sensors (GWS) to collect RF signals to detect the
presence of invading drones. We have used low-cost devises such as Raspberry Pi
which will have GWS sensors, making it affordable for easy deployment. To support
this structure the system will need constant wireless communications with the ground
control station or console via omnidirectional antennas for wireless communication
frequencies. GWS sensors in these devises are used to measure received wireless signal
strength (RSS) of trespassing drones based on wireless communication frequencies.
This was the same assumption that was uses in RF-based drone detection proposal.
However, there is a computability issues between invading drone and GWS sensors.
Therefore, the accuracy of GWS sensors using wireless channels will be not be useful
for drone detection especially when the circumstances of invasion are is random and
unpredictable. This is the case most of the time. Therefore, the GWS’ do not always
have LOS wireless links to the drone as shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 3.1: Representation of our setup
We propose that by placing at least one GWS sensor it will be easy to determine
the existence of NLOS links. When the drones are proximately close the RSS signals
are significantly stronger than the noise threshold. Otherwise, RF signals are not
useful for drone detection.
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Chapter 4
Design Methodology
We plan to have 2 Raspberry Pi devices, to monitor for UAV invasion. One device
will be in LOS with the UAV and the other device will be in NLOS with the UAV. We
will capture the signal strength to further analyze if the signals are from a drone or
some other devices. We then require a consumer UAV to successfully finish research.
4.1 Drone Unique Flying Patterns
Existing research shows us that the motion of drones follows their own aerodynamic
principles through their flying control mechanism. Take quad-motor drones - one of
the most popular drone models – for example, the motion of drones is controlled by
adjusting rotation of the four propellers [10, 28, 50]. In order to achieve equilibrium
while flying the four factors comes into play
• Forces
• Directions
• Moments
• Rotation speed
An appropriate combination is required to maintain the drone in motion which is
achieved by drone’s flying control system [5, 10, 25, 34, 36]. A drone may be in
equilibrium in its unique way due to the following reasons:
• Controller’s reaction to non-deterministic factors such as environmental changes
(e.g., wind), errors within the drone’s control loops and vibrations caused by
propellers
• Flying control algorithms used by the drone given a rich body of available
control algorithms
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• The input from human controllers in case of drones controlled by people (which
is popular for amateur drones)
This tells us, drone flights would exhibit unique patterns due to drone body shift-
ing, propeller and motor vibration, drone control system [22] and finally the user who
is controlling the drone. Drone body shifting occurs when drone tries to balance its
body under due to gust of winds during its flight [14, 48]. It usually takes several
iterations for a drone’s control system to converge to a balance state. Such a converg-
ing process is unique to individual drones due to its unique physical and mechanical
features [29]. A sequence of such body shiftings [51] happen when drone changes
its flight status (e.g., speed, direction) or fights against environmental changes (e.g.,
winds) and can serve as the unique signature for the drone’s movement. In addition
to body shiftings, vibration of drone motor and propellers can cause slight movements
of drone body as studied in. Such vibration (in terms of frequency and magnitude) is
highly correlated with the drone’s mechanical properties, and hence produces another
unique signature of drone motion. Also, the interaction between a drone’s control sys-
tem and human inputs may cause unique patterns of drone motions.
For example, a human controller may create “jitters” off drone movements due to
imperfect estimation of drone’s state (e.g., its speed and acceleration) and some of
the human controller is not experienced in flying drones. So, they experiment with
various controller buttons to create equilibrium in order for the drone to fly. These
“jitters” in turn may cause additional drone body shiftings (due to body adjustment)
and vibration (due to accelerations). The drone’s motion patterns can affect the RF
signals received at receivers. In particular, slight spatial location change of drone
(i.e., its RF transmitter) would result in significant shift in phase of received RF
signals. However, for non-cooperative drones such phase shifts cannot be measured
because of unknown transmitting signals. In this case, we observe received signal
strength (RSS) which is also closely related to the relative distance between the RF
transmitter and the receiver. Different from phase information, the RSS measurement
is the strength of the superposition of RF signals and noise, and is less sensitive to
slight motions. This is particularly true in free space or LOS situations in which RF
path loss is proportional to the logarithm of the distance between the transmitter
and the receiver. In NLOS situations, the slight changes of transmitter locations
may result in more severe change in RSS at receivers. This is because slight changes
in transmitter location may result in different multi-paths of RF propagation. This
provides an opportunity for UAV detection under NLOS scenarios.
4.2 Proof of Drone Motion changing RSS values
In this section we want to prove our hypothesis - The wireless signal transmitted out
by drones will be affected by their motions and these changes are measurable. In
other words, drone motion or vibration causes the change in RSS values. When we
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place the raspberry Pi indoors we have two cases.
• Pi is in NLOS with the drone
• Pi is in LOS with the drone
We first validated our hypothesis for NLOS condition. In Figure 4.1, we take a
start of the peak and an end of the peak to create a zone and observe the results
in that time period. We notice that a sudden change in drone’s motion or when
you cause a sudden vibration we can see the change in RSS measurements. We take
another peak and create a zone and observe the relation between drone motion and
the RSS values in that time period.
Figure 4.1: NLOS Condition PI Placed Indoors – Drone Motion and RSS Relation
Next, we validated our hypothesis in LOS condition. When the drone is in LOS
with the Pi, we take a start of the peak and an end of the peak to create a zone
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and observe the results in that time period as shown in Figure 4.2. We notice that
a sudden change in drone’s motion or when you cause a sudden vibration we can see
the change in RSS measurements. Hence we are able to prove that the drone motion
or vibration is directly proportional to the change in RSS values.
Figure 4.2: NLOS Condition PI Placed Indoors – Drone Motion and RSS Relation
4.3 LOS and NLOS Differentiation
When the transmitter and the receiver are at NLOS locations, the RF signal prop-
agation is usually subject to distortion due to the blockage and obstacles in the
transmission path. This introduces noise to the signal as compared to their LOS
counterparts. RSS measurements at LOS GWS’ and NLOS ones are expected to
have different features such as strength, variance, and distribution. Such significant
differences discourage us from conducting drone detection directly using mixed LOS
and NLOS RSS measurements. Instead, we propose to first differentiate LOS signals
from NLOS signals upon the detection of any RF signals and then apply drone de-
tection on NLOS RSS measurements The flow chart of our system is shown in Fig. 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Flowchart of our system
The main idea of our RSS differentiation scheme is to explore statistical features
from collected RSS measurements, and then employ learning approaches to classify
LOS and NLOS signals. Specifically, we extract the following features from RSS sam-
ples [ri1; ri2;...;rij] for the ith time window – mean values, average log values, standard
deviation, kurtosis, and skewness. In particular, the mean value is used since LOS
usually has stronger RSS measurement compared with NLOS for GWS at similar
distances to the UAV. Standard deviation is used to measure the variance for RSS
samples. Since NLOS signals usually contain more multipath noises, their standard
deviations are expected to be larger than LOS signals. This is intuitively true for both
drone transmitters or RF transmitters on the ground. The average log value converts
the RSS into logarithmic space, because the RSS has a linear relationship with the
logarithmic distance. Kurtosis and skewness measure the peaks and asymmetry of
the RSS probability distribution respectively.
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Figure 4.4: LOS vs NLOS classification using S-SVM
To build the LOS/NLOS classifier, we use the supervised support vector machine
(S-SVM) as the learning model [17] , which is effective for separating low dimensional
feature vectors in two groups. To verify our conjecture, we conducted preliminary
experiments and collected 5,000 sets of drone RSS samples for LOS and NLOS con-
ditions in residential areas, each set has around 10 RSS measurements. For each set
of RSS samples, aforementioned five features are then extracted and a label (LOS
or NLOS) is assigned. These 5,000 feature vectors are then trained with the S-SVM
algorithm to obtain the LOS/NLOS classifier. To evaluate the effectiveness of our
classifier, we further collected 250 LOS and 250 NLOS test sets to validate the accu-
racy of our model. As shown in Fig.4, our learning-based identification solution can
effectively distinguish LOS and NLOS signals, where the likelihood score measures
how likely an input sets shall be LOS (score ≥ 0) or NLOS (score < 0). The results
show that our solution achieves accuracy rates of 98.4% and 96% for LOS and NLOS
signals respectively, over the testing dataset we collected. With the NLOS or LOS
signals identified, our system continues to determine whether the RF signals are from
a drone. To this end, we propose to extract unique features pertaining to drone flight
behaviors, e.g., the motion of drone etc. These features are then processed with deep
learning approaches to confirm the presence of a drone. Due to the difference between
LOS and NLOS signals, we design a deep learning model for drone detection using
NLOS and discuss issues with drone detection with LOS signals.
4.4 NLOS-Based Drone Detection
In NLOS, cases the factors such as multipaths and distortions from any encountered
obstacles have huge impact in the measurement of RSS values. NLOS RF signals
CHAPTER 4. DESIGN METHODOLOGY 13
are difficult to deal with using signal processing methods, mainly because of the
complexity with the wireless channels that NLOS links have to propagate through.
Consequently, the aggregated multipath and signal distortion effects form noise-like
Gaussian distributions. The small change in the transmitter state (e.g., location,
orientation, speed) can lead to significant changes in received signals at the receiver’s
side. While such phenomena produces negative impacts in conventional wireless ap-
plications, it introduces opportunities in drone detection. This is because that the
impact of RF signals from inherent drone motions such as body shifting and vibra-
tions would be “amplified” over the NLOS links. In LOS locations, however, the
change of RF signals (i.e., RSS) is less significant because RF signal propagation over
LOS links is less sensitive to minor motions of the transmitter.
We use LSTM to learn the features of these signatures from RSS measurements.
LSTM is Long Short-Term Memory Network is a RNN created by Hochreiter &
Schmidbhur in 1997 [15]. LSTM retains selective information while training the
dataset. LSTM algorithm has an inbuilt sigmoid function [15]. This retaining pro-
cess is done by a sigmoid function which decides how much information to retain and
how much information to let go during the training process. The sigmoid curve is
shown below.
Figure 4.5: Sigmoid Function in LSTM [2]
Basically, if the output of the sigmoid function is 0 then no information is retained
and if the output is 1, all the information is retained. The below figure represents
the overall general algorithm of LSTM.
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Figure 4.6: Implementation of LSTM(Long Short-Term Memory) [15]
In our design, we take the RSS measurements and normalize the dataset. Let
X be the normalized data and process them so that the vector size is 126. We set
the batch size to 128 and the epoch value to 100. The reason why we selected these
values is because this combination yields higher accuracy during testing. Detailed
evaluation is given in Chapter 5. To validate the effectiveness of our design, we
conduct preliminary experiments to collect NLOS RSS data from drones and other
mobile sources, including GoPro camera and smartphones, for training and exploring
fingerprints. We take LSTM algorithm and train the vectorized RSS measurements
and classify them into 0s and 1s. 0 represents non-drone’s RSS measurements and 1
represents drone’s RSS measurements. The below flowchart represents the process in
NLOS-Based Drone Detection
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Figure 4.7: Flowchart for NLOS Based Drone Detection and Classification
4.5 LOS Based Detection
When the drone is at LOS locations, its RF signal propagation largely follows the
free-space path-loss model [24],in which the RSS is expected to be dominated by the
direct path component. A popular free-space pass-loss model [24] for drones is given
as follows where t represents the time slot of current transmission:
PL(t) = 20log10dt + 20log10f − 27.55 (4.1)
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where dt is the current distance between drone and the detector, and f is the trans-
mission frequency. As indicated by Eq, the RSS (in dBm) changes linearly to the
logarithm of the distance dt, i.e., the change of 1/10 dt in distance results in around
1 dB change in RSS. For example, when the transmitter and the receiver are 10m
away, 1 dB change in RSS requires 1m change in dt; the same RSS change only needs
0.1m change in dt when the distance dt is 1m. For drone detection, however, the
drone is less likely to be too close to the detector. For drone motions such as body
shifting and vibration, the change of drone locations due to these motions is expected
to be within few centimeters for popular small-sized drones. RSS variations caused by
such motions can be negligible considering various noises added to measured RSS. To
detect such minor RSS variations, existing work [39] employs high-grain directional
antenna, which is effective in eliminating noises such as multipath. Meanwhile, high-
quality RSS measurement module is needed to minimize hardware and measurement
errors. For this purpose, [39] uses a USRP to measure the received RF signal. These
advanced devices, however, significantly add to the total cost of the drone detector.
Moreover, deploying directional antenna for drone detection is impractical unless an
array directional antennas are deployed to cover 360 degree space. This is because ap-
proaching direction of an invading drone is usually a prior unknown. Another work [8]
detects drone by comparing short term and long-term variations of RSS with a noise
threshold. Instead of using the slight body motions such as shifting and vibration,
this work assumes the existence of a fixed flying pattern of an invading drone, i.e.,
the drone will strictly follow three phases-approach, surveillance, escape - to fulfill
its tasks. It also requires that the invading drone to be in very close proximity (few
meters) to the detector during surveillance and be always within direct LOS angle to
the drone detector during the drone detection period. While these assumptions may
hold in some scenarios, they are by no means true for general applications wherein
the drone may not have to approach the target very closely to carry out its tasks.
What is more, using a predetermined fixed noise threshold for drone identification
can be problematic given the dynamic property of the noise. In general, however,
accurately detecting drones in LOS locations using RSS is challenging. This is par-
ticularly true for low-cost wireless devices with which severe noises existing during
RSS measurements.
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Chapter 5
Experiments
5.1 Experiment Setup
In this section, we evaluate our design in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. To
evaluate the performance of our system, we conducted experiments using a self-built
drone and a popular model drone DJI SPARK. We also included other consumer
wireless devices including GoPro camera and smartphones to evaluate the accuracy
of the drone detection system. We use Raspberry PI 3 Model B+, which costs less
than $50 at the time of performing the experiment, as drone detection system. We
conducted extensive experiments in a residential area/apartment complex to evaluate
real-world scenarios as shown in the figure below.
Figure 5.1: The bird view of the residential area
The residence house that hosted the Raspberry Pi had concrete walls. During our
experiments, we placed the Raspberry Pi at two locations inside the residence house to
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create LOS and NLOS situations for every test case. Different from existing work [39],
our Raspberry Pi is equipped with a commodity USB Wi-Fi module Edimax N150.
The drone used its built-in commodity WiFi module for communications. Both Wi-Fi
modules are omni-directional and operate at 2.4GHz. No pre-configuration or cali-
bration is needed. The flying patterns and the Raspberry Pi placement are shown in
the figure below.
Figure 5.2: Flying patterns of the drone
Four different flying patterns were evaluated to simulate real-world scenarios.
These patterns were flying in Straight lines (which include back and forth flying),
zig-zag lines, curve lines, going in a circle. For each drone flying pattern we simulta-
neously collected RSS measurements of non-drone Wi-Fi devices including one GoPro
camera during the model training phase. During the drone’s flight, the non-drone de-
vice was carried by a person walking along the same path of the drone but at ground
altitude. This is to assure that non-drone RSS’ are always present wherever the drone
is. The drone was flying 5m above the ground. For each test case, we let the drone
fly from far away toward the target house, then pass the house until its RSS cannot
be measured. During the testing phase, we changed to different drone and different
non-drone devices and collected their RSS measurements. This training and testing
process are repeated for different GWS (i.e., Raspberry Pi) location and drone flying
pattern combinations. The RSS values were collected at the rate of 20 samples per
second.
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5.2 Evaluation
5.2.1 Setting the batch size and vector size
We used LSTM to train RSS measurements (just the NLOS samples). After the
model is trained, we used new samples to test the accuracy. The epoch value is set as
100, the stride is set as 9 and we set the batch size and vector size to be 64 initially.
The accuracy and training time we got in training 27,392 RSS measurements and
testing 6,912 RSS measurements is as below
Table 5.1: Training time during Batch Size 64 and Vector Size 64.
Total Ac-
curacy
(%)
Training
Data
Testing
Data
Training
Time
(seconds)
93.5 428 108 8.72
Then, we set the batch size to be 128 and vector size to be 126. The accuracy and
the training time we got in training 50,526 RSS measurements and testing 12,726 is
as below
Table 5.2: Training time during Batch Size 128 and Vector Size 126.
Total Ac-
curacy
(%)
Training
Data
Testing
Data
Training
Time
(seconds)
97.02 401 101 12.75
Then, we set the batch size to be 256 and vector size to be 256. The accuracy and
the training time we got in training 87,808 RSS measurements and testing 22,016 is
as below
Table 5.3: Training time during Batch Size 256 and Vector Size 256.
Total Ac-
curacy
(%)
Training
Data
Testing
Data
Training
Time
(seconds)
97.67 343 86 23.73
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We can notice that as the batch size and vector size increase the accuracy is higher.
But the downside is the training time of data is also increasing. To balance out the
accuracy we set our batch size to be 128 and vector size to be 126 throughout our
experiments.
5.2.2 Same house training and testing scenario
To evaluate the necessity of differentiating the drone RSS values from a Non-Drone
RSS values in NLOS cases, we used LSTM to train 50,526 RSS measurements (just
the NLOS samples). After the model is trained, we used around 12,726 new samples
to test the accuracy of the model. The experimental results for same house training
and testing scenario along with the accuracy are as below. For our testing samples
we had 7,308 drone samples and 5,418 non-drone samples.
Table 5.4: Same House Training and Testing Scenario.
Total Ac-
curacy
(%)
Stride
Training
Data
Testing
Data
True neg-
ative
False pos-
itive
97.02 9 401 101 0 13.9
In our data validation for the same house training and testing scenarios, the ac-
curacy is 97.02% which is a higher accuracy for detecting a drone and a non-drone
samples from the RSS measurements. The training time is 12.75 s. The higher ac-
curacy and our training time show us that our LSTM algorithm is successful for
differentiating the RSS samples in NLOS cases.
5.2.3 Trasfer trained scenarios
In the above scenario we observed that the accuracy to differentiate between a drone
and Non-Drone in the NLOS RSS signals is 97.02%. In order to generalize the model
we divide the further experiments into 3 parts. We used three different houses to
validate our results. Here we trained the model using Person A’s apartment data
and test the model with Person B apartment data. Similarly, we do the same thing
with Person C’s data as training and Person B’s data to test our result. We then
compare the results with a combined training model Person A and C’s data and test
with Person B’s data.
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5.2.3.1 Case A - Person A training vs Person B testing
To evaluate the generalized model of differentiating the drone RSS values from a
Non-Drone RSS values in NLOS cases, we used different house training and testing
scenarios. We used LSTM to train 63,252 RSS measurements (just the NLOS sam-
ples) from Person A’s data. After the model was trained, we used around 60,102 new
samples to test the accuracy of the model from Person B’s Data. The experimental
results for same house training and testing scenario along with the accuracy are as
below. We set 126 as the vector size and 128 as the batch size.
Table 5.5: Different House Training and Testing Scenario .
Total Ac-
curacy
(%)
Training
Data
Testing
Data
66.45 502 477
In our data validation for the different house training and testing scenarios, the
accuracy is 66.45%. Such a low accuracy is mainly because of the NLOS samples
from two different apartment have distinct statistical features due to the different
multipaths included and the surrounding environment is different.
5.2.3.2 Case B - Person C training vs Person B testing
To evaluate the generalized model of differentiating the drone RSS values from a Non-
Drone RSS values in NLOS cases, we first used the same house training and testing
scenarios. We used LSTM to train 289,044 RSS measurements (just the NLOS sam-
ples) from Person C’s data. After the model is trained, we used around 60,102 new
samples to test the accuracy of the model from Person B’s data. The experimental
results for same house training and testing scenario along with the accuracy are as
below. We set 126 as the vector size and 128 as the batch size.
Table 5.6: Different House Training and Testing Scenario .
Total Ac-
curacy
(%)
Training
Data
Testing
Data
14.88 2294 477
In our data validation for the different house training and testing scenarios, the
accuracy is 14.88%. Such a low accuracy is mainly because of the NLOS samples
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from two different apartment have distinct statistical features due to the different
multipaths included and the surrounding environment is different. From the above
two cases we see that we get low accuracy when we transfer train the model. A
comprehensive model trained from both types of RSS measurements is not able to
capture the features of each of them. To improve this, we combined the training
model Person A and Person C’s data and tested it with Person B’s data. Basically,
we followed the idea of Data Augmentation as data augmentation covers the missing
features when collecting RSS values to avoid statistical difference during our testing
process.
5.2.3.3 Case C - Person A and Person C training vs Person B testing
To evaluate the generalized model of differentiating the drone RSS values from a Non-
Drone RSS values in NLOS cases, we first used the same house training and testing
scenarios. We used LSTM to train 125,496 RSS measurements (just the NLOS sam-
ples) from Person A and Person C’s data. After the model is trained, we used around
60,102 new samples to test the accuracy of the model from Person B’s data. The
experimental results for same house training and testing scenario along with the ac-
curacy are as below. We set 126 as the vector size and 128 as the batch size.
Table 5.7: Different Combined House Training and Testing Scenario.
Total Ac-
curacy
(%)
Training
Data
Testing
Data
83.64 996 477
In our data validation for the different house training and testing scenarios, the
accuracy is 83.64%. The accuracy is reasonable in the combined training model
because when we combined the model, we covered the missing features when we
changed the surrounding. So, when we tested it gave us a higher accuracy. Also,
Person C’s (494 records) data is reduced to avoid data overfitting and to match
Person A’s (502 records) data.
5.2.4 Advantages of using multiple house for training
Every house has different blueprint and the surroundings are different. When we do
transfer training or generalize our model to detect drone RSS values, we might not
cover all the features and this yield lower accuracy. In order to cover all the features
for training we need to combine multiple models for training and as a result we get
higher accuracy. This tells us that our model trained using LSTM detects the drone
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTS 23
and non-drone signals in NLOS scenarios reasonably accurate compared with other
training models. Transfer learning proves that this model is applicable in different
scenarios.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
6.1 Conclusions
In this work, we developed a method to detect privacy-invasion attacks by drones
based on their flying patterns, communication with their respective controller. This
method is an RSS-based drone detection approach using low-cost COTS devices which
is dramatically different from recent researches. Our approach does not require drones
to be at LOS locations, nor does it mandate any manually introduced fly pattern
though we do take advantage of inherent flying patterns of drones that are implicitly
caused by their unique control and mechanical systems
To this end, we employ deep learning to capture collective features, in received
RF signals. Without knowing the presence of drones, we start with classifying any
detected RF signals (i.e., their RSS measurements) into LOS signals and/or NLOS
signals using S-SVM, and then using LSTM model to detect drone on NLOS signals
respectively.
Our experimental results show that our work is able to detect drones in NLOS
locations at a rate over 97% in the same house training and testing scenario. When
transfer learning is applied then we are able to detect drone at a rate over 83%.
This is in sharp contrast with the state-of-the-art passive RF-based drone detection
techniques which almost disfunction in NLOS scenarios. For LOS scenario, we confirm
its incompetency in drone detection through analytical study and a set of experiments.
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6.2 Future Research
In this work we empirically employ deep learning for drone detection for NLOS sit-
uations. We employed LSTM, a generative model, to extract features with RSS
measurements. Different from existing work which are mainly based on signal pro-
cessing, our learning-based solution is able to extract sophisticated features from RSS
and allow us to accurately detect drones in NLOS locations using commodity wireless
interfaces. This significantly alleviates the requirements for drone detection systems
as imposed by existing signal processing-based solutions. Interestingly, our experi-
ments show a set of counter-intuition results in terms of drone detection accuracy
as compared to these signal processing-based solutions. Specifically, we found that
NLOS RSS measurements are more effective than LOS RSS for drone detection. With
the nearly perfect NLOS drone detection accuracy, it will be interesting to explore
the boundary of the accuracy for LOS drone detection as well as a more reliable drone
detection mechanism in general. Specifically, we observe the following directions for
such improvements:
• Collaborative sensors: in our current design, each GWS work independently
to detect drones. It would be interesting to deploy a network of collaborating
GWS’. With our LOS and NLOS differentiation algorithm, each GWS is able to
know whether it is at LOS location to the suspicious target (i.e., drone). Given
the high drone detection rate in NLOS locations, our design can be extended to
select only NLOS GWS’ for collaborative drone detection. Fusing algorithms
such as majority voting can be utilized to obtain the final detection result.
Interestingly, once drone is detected the system can work in the opposite way
to localize the drone by selecting only LOS GWS’ because LOS locations are
superior in wireless localization than NLOS locations.
• Detection of multiple drones: our current work focuses on detecting a single
drone. However, in practice, it is possible to have multiple drones or a swarm of
drones simultaneously invading a zone. One challenge for multi-drone detection
is the interference of the drone communications which may lead to temporal
sparse RSS measurements and prevent the recovery of temporal features with
drones.
Finally, we also plan to use cloud-based platform in a residential neighborhood
with the help of local law enforcements. The user can upload their model to the
cloud and check the presence of drone signals. We are also thinking about the cloud
rejecting the user model, if the model sent by the user is a malicious file.
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